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Abstract: How can social actors halt retreats to metadialogues that involve nit-picking or unwarranted charges, and 
why can they expect the strategies to work? Krabbe (2003) has proposed a dialectical regulation designed to forestall 
or halt retreats from ground-level discussions to metadialogues: paying the costs of the metadialogue. I argue that this 
dialectical regulation deserves to be taken seriously because it is realistic and encompasses a range of strategies that 
ordinary social actors take as reasonable. 
 





For years people have been designing messages to try to get other people to acknowledge and 
address systemic sexism in health care, criminal justice, and other areas. Systemic sexism creates 
worlds of hurt for many including Black and Indigenous women who experience 
disproportionately high rates of violence and death (e.g., Baker 2019; finoh and Sankofa 2019; 
Lorde 2007; Martin 2020; Tasker 2019). Questions about how to address systemic problems are 
ripe for public discussion—for making arguments in the course of proposing, reporting, advising, 
advocating, exhorting, and more. But contributors to online and face-to-face communication about 
everyday, widespread experiences of sexism identify an ongoing problem in these discussions: 
interrupting or derailing discussions by  qualifying that “not all men” act in ways that harm women 
(e.g., Hemmings 2017; Lee 2017; McKinney 2014; Ryan 2014; Shavisi 2019; Wambui 2014; 
Woolley 2014). Using the qualifiers initiates a retreat to metadialogue—i.e., dialogue about 
dialogue—about whether to take “not all men” as a derailment and interruption of the ground-level 
discussion or as a legitimate correction of overgeneralizations or harmful stereotypes about men. 
These clashes provide an opportunity to see what strategies social actors use to halt retreats to 
metadialogue and why they can expect the strategies to work. 
 Questions about how to analyze and evaluate metadialogues in argumentation have been 
approached dialectically. One approach involves analyzing the metadialogue in terms of “strategic 
maneuvering”—topic potential, audience adaptation, and presentational devices—and evaluating 
it according to the rules for a critical discussion (van Eemeen and Houtlosser 2009). By the 
measure of a critical discussion, the moves that can be made legitimately in a metadialogue are 
quite limited. Are the only reasonable options for getting addressees to halt retreats to 
metadialogue “suggesting” or “insisting” on readjustments or repairs, provided the suggesting and 
insisting do not violate dialectical rules for a critical discussion (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2009, 
pp. 204, 205)? On face, no. For example, although directives such as demanding that an interactant 
stop nit-picking or making unwarranted charges are “taboo in a critical discussion” (van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst 2004, p. 64), social actors can and do coherently discuss whether demands are 




Yes: Krabbe (2003) has suggested formulating separate rules for metadialogues. He has 
attempted to address the problem of how to regulate “retreats into metadialogue” in cases where 
“one is confronted with nit-picking or completely unwarranted charges” (Krabbe 2003, p. 83). He 
has described it as an “equity problem,” or a problem of trying to “strike a balance” between “a 
right to contest the correctness of any ground level move” and having a “means of defense” against 
what on face appear to be unreasonable retreats into metadialogue (Krabbe 2003, p. 83). He has 
formulated a rule for addressing the problem: the interactant “is to pay the costs of the 
metadialogue” or, put differently, be “punished with a fine” (Krabbe 2003, p. 89) for committing 
a fallacy. I argue that this notion of paying a cost or fine deserves to be taken seriously (cf. van 
Eemeren and Houtlosser 2009, p. 203) because it aligns with ordinary social actors’ 
communication theories or reflections on how strategies are designed to work, and is flexible 
enough to encompass a range of normative materials social actors bring to bear in interactions. 
   
2.  Methods  
 
To support that claim I analyze an extended online post designed to halt retreats to metadialogues 
about using the qualifier “not all men.” Brenda Wambui (2014) titles her post “The problem with 
‘not all men’ and why you should stop saying this.” Wambui is a self-described writer, podcaster, 
adventurer, and entrepreneur. She published her post on Medium, an online publishing platform, 
in 2014 when clash over how to take “not all men” “really began exploding” in the U.S. (Ryan 
2014). I selected this essay for analysis because it is exemplary among the many extended online 
objections to “not all men” for reasoning, comprehensiveness, and outrage. Wambui (2014) 
explicitly frames the discussion as a numbered list of “reasons” why people should stop saying 
“not all men”; discusses a range of reasons why saying “not all men” is a problem; and expresses 
outrage throughout and in concluding that people inclined to interrupt and derail a discussion of 
systemic sexism by saying “not all men” should “have a seat and pour yourself a nice, big cup of 
SHUT THE FUCK UP.” Neither “suggesting” nor “insisting” adequately captures what Wambui 
(2014) is doing. I submit that the message is designed to make it increasingly costly for addressees 
to continue derailing discussions of systemic sexism and to create reasons for addressees to hedge 
their bets and stop saying “not all men.” 
 I use the term “design” to focus critical attention on the actual strategies used in the 
message, and to see whether and to what extent the notion of paying a cost for derailing discussion 
explains how social actors can reasonably halt retreats to metadialogue. A design perspective holds 
that inherent to using communication strategies are lay understandings or hypotheses about how 
strategies work, and these understandings and hypotheses are theories (Aakhus 2007; Craig 1996; 
Jackson and Aakhus 2014). By looking at communication strategies social actors use and their 
reflections on why they expect the strategies to work, we can see whether and to what extent their 
communication theories align with Krabbe’s (2003) notion that ground-level discussions can be 
regulated by interactants paying costs for nit-picking or unwarranted charges. The analysis 
proceeds by describing the “natural normativity” (Jackson 2019) or responsibilities or obligations 




In what follows I show that Wambui’s (2014) post is openly, deliberately designed to get 
addressees to stop saying “not all men” during online discussions of women subjected to “assault, 
3 
 
harassment and systemic oppression.” She uses strategies that make it increasingly costly for them 
to do so and that increase her own risk of paying a cost. As a result she creates reasons for 
addressees to hedge their bets and halt retreats to metadialogue. 
 
Openly, deliberately intending to halt retreats to metadialogue by demanding 
 
 Wambui (2014) uses strategies designed to leave herself and addressees no room to 
plausibly deny her intent to get them to stop saying “not all men.” She titles the post “The problem 
with ‘not all men’ and why you should stop saying this” and closes it by writing, “have a seat and 
pour yourself a nice, big cup of SHUT THE FUCK UP.” What strategies does she use to get 
addressees to stop saying “not all men” and why does she expect them to work? Although she 
frames her post as a numbered list of “reasons” why she wants “2014 to be the year we kill this 
ridiculous statement,” and although she structures the post like a classical judicial oration 
(introduction narration, proposition, proof, refutation, peroration), it reads less like a speech of 
accusation than a demand. Inherent to accusing is an intent to get the accused to respond to a 
charge (Kauffeld 1998), but nothing in Wambui’s (2014) post indicates amenability to further 
discussion of any issue of fact, definition, or quality, or to ongoing metadialogue about “not all 
men.” 
To make explicit the normativity inherent to demanding, consider reasons for acceding 
created just by uttering, “I demand that you stop saying ‘not all men,’” or, put differently, why 
somebody who demands that addressees stop saying “not all men” can reasonably expect just 
saying that to get them to stop. Inherent to demanding are claims to occupy the substantive and 
procedural high ground relative to addressees (Innocenti and Kathol 2018). Other things being 
equal, demanding lacks persuasive force if addressees can with impunity dismiss the demand as 
substantively wrong—e.g., demanding addressees to act contrary to a moral code—or procedurally 
wrong—e.g., demanding instead of suggesting, insisting, requesting, proposing, and the like. The 
more vividly and conspicuously demanders can show that they occupy the substantive and 
procedural high ground relative to addressees—e.g., by using strategies such as blocking traffic on 
major streets or taking over campus buildings in order to get people with institutional power to 
engage in ground-level discussions of how cases of missing and murdered Indigenous women are 
investigated or lack of women’s health care services—the more they risk paying a cost for stepping 
out of bounds procedurally and substantively. So addressees can reason that demanders would not 
risk paying a cost unless they (demanders) could count on audiences seeing that they occupy the 
substantive and procedural high ground. Addressees now have a reason to hedge their bets and 
accede to the demand. At the same time demanding puts addressees at risk of paying a cost for 
continuing to enact what may now be seen as morally, ethically, procedurally questionable 
positions—e.g., for failing to discuss or stalling discussions of indifference in investigating cases 
of missing and murdered Indigenous women or lack of women’s health care services. So 
addressees can reason that to avoid paying the cost, they can accede to the demand. In short, 
demanding creates reasons for addressees to accede. 
Wambui (2014) designs her post to make it increasingly costly for addressees to continue 
saying “not all men” and to forestall easy dismissal of her demand that they stop saying it. By 
doing so she creates reasons for addressees to hedge their bets and halt retreats to metadialogues 
about “not all men.” Rather than trying to provide a comprehensive analysis of Wambui’s (2014) 
post, I discuss two examples of a twofold strategy: enacting her understanding of how to reason 




Making it increasingly costly to continue retreating to metadialogue 
 
The first reason Wambui (2014) presents for “why you should stop saying this” enacts her 
ability to reason about statistics and charges a penalty of resentment for addressees who continue 
to insult women’s intelligence by suggesting they do not understand the nature of generalizations: 
“Women are not stupid, of course we know that ‘not all men are rapists/sexual harassers’ or 
whatever. The statistics say so.” She then sketches widespread patterns of experiences of situations 
ripe for harassment and assault that show sexism is systemic: 
 
How are we supposed to know who is saying hi in a friendly manner, or who actually needs 
directions, as opposed to just wanting to harass us? Most women end up assuming the worst 
because MOST times they have assumed the best, they have endured painful consequences. 
That stranger you once decided to stop and give directions ended up following you to your 
destination because he mistook your kindness for interest. That man you casually chatted 
with at the bar when you thought you were being nice ended up forcing himself on you, 
kissing you against your wishes. It is safer for us to learn that you are a “good man” when 
we are suspicious than to learn, rather painfully, that you are a bad man because we gave 
you the benefit of doubt. 
 
Wambui’s (2014) strategies create a context where addressees risk paying a cost—resentment—if 
they continue to retreat to metadialogues by saying “not all men,” because saying so would be a 
fallible sign that they are ignoring or willfully blinding themselves to her enactment of reasoning 
about generalizations and to her sketching of widespread patterns of experiences. She makes that 
cost conspicuous by expressing sarcasm and outrage: “Yes, make a discussion that is about the 
plight of MILLIONS of women about poor little old you. I mean, millions of women are being 
assaulted and oppressed, but you’ve never done it, so why are we making you uncomfortable with 
these discussions.” In short, she displays a serious claim to occupy the substantive and procedural 
high ground relative to addressees who derail discussions of systemic sexism by qualifying “not 
all men” so creates a reason—avoiding further resentment—for halting retreats to metadialogues. 
 A second example of her twofold strategy is the fifth reason she presents. She enacts 
understanding of how to reason about statistics and uses contrast and repetition to bring systemic 
sexism into sharp focus: 
 
Most women AND men are raped by men. The rape statistics in Kenya are shocking. The 
fact that you have never hit a woman does not negate the fact that most violence against 
women is gender based, and is perpetrated by men. The fact that you have never raped a 
woman (or man) does not negate the fact that most rapists are male. The fact that you know 
women who are educated does not erase the fact that more women than men are uneducated 
by design. The fact that you know women who earn more than you does not negate the fact 
that women still earn less than men for the same work. This is the reality. THIS IS NOT 
ABOUT YOU. 
 
Again, Wambui (2014) creates a context where addressees increasingly risk paying a cost of 
resentment if they continue to say “not all men.” She makes the cost clear by shouting in all-caps 
that the discussion is not about individuals. Both examples indicate Wambui’s (2014) 
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communication design theory, or why she reasonably expects her strategies to work. The strategies 
create a reason for addressees to stop saying “not all men”: avoiding paying a cost for the 
metadialogue, namely resentment for insulting women’s intelligence and for promulgating a 
narrow, self-centered perspective in the face of systemic problems. 
 
Creating reasons to hedge a bet against retreats to metadialogue 
 
Other things being equal, risks to addressees of paying a cost disappear if Wambui (2014) 
fails to make good on claims to occupy the substantive and procedural high ground—if, for 
example, she errs in how she reasons about statistics or crosses a line in how she expresses outrage. 
Wambui (2014) steps outside the bounds of conventional, conversational norms including using 
politeness and face-saving strategies. In addition to using all-caps and cussing, Wambui (2014) 
expresses contempt—e.g., “We are talking about structural issues: patriarchal society, institutions 
and systems. You are the one who takes it upon yourself to make this personal with your ‘not all 
men’ slogan.” She uses biting sarcasm—e.g., “When you INTERRUPT a discussion on 
misogyny/rape culture/sexism to let us know that you are not like these men, you SILENCE the 
women and men having these discussions, and DERAIL the conversation from its initial purpose 
to illuminate the plight of women, to dealing with you and your supersedingly important feelings.” 
She expresses outrage—e.g., “Is it that you want us to acknowledge (and quite possibly commend) 
the fact that you have never assaulted a woman? As my friend @NonieMG once asked, do you 
want us to give you a cookie for being ‘a good man’? Pause for a second and think about how 
MESSED UP that is.” She describes saying “not all men” as “a douche move.”  
The more Wambui (2014) uses these strategies to display resentment, outrage, contempt, 
and more, the more she risks a paying a cost of resentment for crossing a line. That vivid, 
conspicuous willingness to risk resentment creates a reason for addressees inclined to continue 
saying “not all men” to stop saying it. Addressees can reason that Wambui (2014) would not risk 
paying a cost of resentment unless she were confident that her claim to occupy the moral and 
procedural high ground would hold up under public scrutiny. This is a reason for addressees to 




Wambui’s (2014) post did not end the derailments. Indeed, metadialogue about saying “not all 
men” is ongoing on Twitter and internationally (e.g., Bateman 2018; Hemmings 2017; Shavisi 
2019). An episode of “The Twilight Zone” even addressed it (Robinson 2019). Still, Wambui’s 
(2014) post and others like it are designed to create a context for discussing systemic sexism 
without retreats to metadialogue. Of course having reasons to do something or not does not 
guarantee addressees will act. But Wambui (2014) creates a context where addressees incur some 
costs of retreating to metadialogues by saying “not all men”: if Wambui’s (2014) position 
withstands public scrutiny, she and others can curse and shout at addressees who continue to use 
the qualifier “not all men” with impunity. 
The analysis shows that Krabbe’s (2003) notion of paying the costs of a metadialogue 
deserves to be taken seriously. The notion of paying a cost in order to regulate interaction aligns 
with ordinary social actors’ communication theories. Consequently, the analysis belies the 
assertion that the notion of a paying a cost does not solve the problem of unreasonably holding up 
ground-level discussion “in any theoretically motivated way” (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2009, 
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p. 203). The notion of paying costs is theoretical because it is based on lay theories about how 
strategies work. The theorizing is not deductive, or based on an ideal model, and as a result avoids 
problems of analyzing and evaluating argumentation and public deliberation against an ideal 
model; these problems have been rehearsed by both argumentation and public deliberation 
theorists (e.g., Jacobs 2000; Mansbridge et al. 2006).  
Nonetheless, philosophical theorizing supporting the notion of paying a cost is at hand. 
Grice’s (1957; 1969) account of what it means to seriously say and mean something in terms of 
reflexive speaker intentions and Stampe’s (1967) account of Grice’s i4—why openly, deliberately 
getting addressees to recognize the speaker’s intention to get them to respond in particular way, to 
get them to recognize that intention, and to get them to recognize the intention to recognize the 
intention provides some reason for addressees to respond as the speaker intends—undergird 
Kauffeld’s (e.g., 1998; 2001) work in argumentation and have been shown to align with lay 
theorizing about strategies including appealing to dignity authority (Goodwin 2001) and exhorting 
(Kauffeld and Innocenti 2018). This theorizing has been described as “normative pragmatics” 
because it accounts for the persuasiveness of strategies in normative terms: strategies are effective 
because they are ethical (Goodwin 2018; Manolescu 2005). 
 Krabbe’s (2003) notion of paying a cost provides a way for argumentation theorists to talk 
about questionable tactics in a way that avoids what Boudry et al. (2015) have described as the 
“fallacy fork,” or the difficulty of finding textbook fallacies in real life and the diminishing 
heuristic value of “fallacy” if definitions of fallacies are sufficiently watered down so they can be 
found in real life. As Boudry et al. (2015) note, pinning down flaws is complicated when “much 
is left to interpretation and multiple exit strategies remain open to the offender” (p. 450). Instead 
of continuing to aspire to a coherent theory of fallacy, researchers can attend to how actual social 
actors regulate their interactions. Boudry et al.’s (2015) position is compatible with Jacobs and 
Jackson’s (2006) view that the use of any tactic must be understood in a broader context because 
what may seem like a textbook fallacy may in fact be reasonable. For example, although at first 
glance making a threat is contrary to norms of argumentation, threat of a penalty discourages 
perjury so creates conditions for better discussion as interactants will tell the truth as best they can 
(Jacobs and Jackson 2006). As the analysis of Wambui’s (2014) post indicates, demanding and 
expressing outrage and resentment can be reasonable moves designed to halt retreats to 
metadialogue. 
Krabbe (2003) does not claim to have addressed all problems associated with 
metadialogues. Indeed, in this case an equity problem remains. Even if Wambui (2014) and others 
finally “win” the metadialogue and get people to stop saying “not all men,” they still pay some 
portion of the metadialogue cost because the ground-level discussion is nonetheless stalled. 
Further, Wambui (2014) incurs risks of paying costs and, as discussions are ongoing, may be made 
to pay costs. But the equity problem is not solvable with dialectical theorizing. After all, where are 
the rules, procedures, or practices that have solved the equity problem once and for all? A benefit 
of Krabbe’s (2003) notion of paying a cost is that it encompasses a broad range of strategies that 
social actors can use to try to regulate their interactions and manage disagreement. In this case the 
analysis has focused on regulating discussion by penalizing bad moves—by using “sticks”—but it 
is also possible for social actors to regulate by rewarding good moves—by using “carrots” that 
create affordances for displaying open-mindedness, kindness, empathy, or other qualities of “good 
citizenship” in the circumstances (Goodwin 2002, p. 93; Innocenti and Miller 2016, p. 379). 
Investigating how actual social actors bring to bear dialectical ideals to regulate interaction can 
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